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G u a n g t i a n H aThe Silent Hat: Islam, Female Labor, and the Political
Economy of the Headscarf Debate
hile preparing for the landmark 1910 Edinburgh Missionary Confer-
ence that was to initiate themodern Protestant ecumenical movement,W Samuel Zwemer, the tireless “Apostle to Islam,” as he was nicknamed
in the Protestant missionary circle (Wilson 1952) wrote in the preface to his
colleagueMarshall Broomhall’s book, “the accessibleMoslem population of
China is larger than the Moslem population of Egypt, Persia, or Arabia; and
yet practically nothing has been done for them. . . . The critical hour is at
hand when Moslem mission in China must be faced, and specialists set to
work to win this great neglected class for the Christ” (in Mott, Beach, and
Zwemer 1910, ix–x). Indeed, perhaps as a tribute to this ambitious proposal,
Broomhall’s book, published in the same year, was titled Islam in China: A
Neglected Problem (1910).
Zwemer’s commitment to “win this great neglected class for the Christ”
went far beyond lip service. In 1933, accompanied by his equally devoted
missionary son-in-law Claude L. Pickens Jr., Zwemer trekked the rugged
terrain of northwest China in search of theMuslims, among whomhe hoped
to sow the seeds of the gospel. The trip produced something remarkable and
profound: a rich archive of notes, images, and pamphlets, suffused with cu-
riosities and bewilderments, still fresh with their power to captivate after
eighty years. One image taken on the fertile Wuzhong plain in Ningxia por-
trays a youngHuiMuslimwoman,mounted on a donkey, traversing the nar-
row dirt path by a rice paddy (see ﬁg. 1). Rein in hands, she sits well balanced
on the back of the beast. She might even be pregnant, if the bump is not an
optical illusion wrought on her dress by a gentle breeze. “Off for a visit,” the
caption reads.What is most eye-catching andmight have been the reason for
the production of this image is the head cover she wears: presumably a blackMy special thanks go to Ma Jianfu of Northern University of Nationalities in China. His
long-term ﬁeldwork in northwest China, his sensitivity to the issue of gender, and his unre-
served generosity in sharing his own ﬁndings has helped me greatly in clarifying the arguments
in this article. Zhan Yang has read through an early draft of this article and offered invaluable
suggestions. My ﬁeldwork was made possible by generous funding from the Wenner-Gren
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for their unwavering support.
[Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 2017, vol. 42, no. 3]
© 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/2017/4203-0012$10.00
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
744 y Ha
All usscarf, neatly ﬁt to the outline of her skull and tightly pinned down the chin,
covering her ears and neck and leaving only her face showing.
The missionary team had a sustained interest in what they called the
“headgears” of the local Muslim women. In another portrait, this one shot
in the nearby Gansu Province, a middle-aged Muslim woman in tattered
clothes is captured in the frame, with the caption saying she is a “caretaker”
at the local gongbei (Arabic: qubba), or shrine, of a Suﬁ saint (see ﬁg. 2).
Maybe it was warm (the shadows indicate noon on a sunny day), maybe
the thread buttons on the collar had long fallen off, or maybe she barely
realized she was being “captured” by a camera operated by a male gaze.
The ragged cotton coat hangs loosely on her skinny body, her neck fully
exposed. Rather than a headscarf, she wears a light-colored cylindrical hat
that leaves her ears uncovered; they are adorned with gold rings, likely from
her dowry when she was married off by her family years before.
The variety of Hui Muslim women’s “headgear” far surpassed what
Zwemer and Pickens observed on their journey. At the time when these pic-
tures were taken and documented, upper-class elite Hui families were being
ushered into the age of modern photography. Rather than being passively
captured, they actively posed for the camera. A photo from a wedding cer-
emony of an inﬂuential Suﬁ family (ﬁg. 3) shows the brides dressed in theFigure 1 “Off for a visit,” Claude L. Pickens Jr., 1936, Wuzhong, Ningxia, northwest China.
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All uslatest fashion of the day, an elegant and stylish cheongsam, or qipao, a type of
one-piece gown that bespoke a distinctly upper-class status in the Republi-
can period (1911–49).Theﬁne silky apparel worn by the olderwomen seated
next to the unmistakable head of the household reﬂects the bright light that
shines into the room. Neither of the two mothers-in-law has bound feet,
though Hui women were no more exempt from this custom than their
Han sisters in imperial times. And none of the women have their hair cov-
ered; the young brides wear ﬂoral accessories, and the light fringe cut of their
hair puts them in line with trendsetting ladies strolling the streets of metro-
politan Shanghai.The veil, again
What is the point of revisiting Muslim women’s head wear—whether and
how they cover their hair—when this topic has already been extensively dis-
cussed by critical theorists across a wide range of national and transnational
contexts?1 It is not only academics who might be weary of this attempt. “IFigure 3 Wedding of an elite Suﬁ family, author’s personal collection. Photographer unknown.1 A large body of literature has been published in this regard. Apart from those that will be
discussed in more detail below, other works include El-Guindi (1999), Çınar (2008), Heath
(2008), Gabriel and Hannan (2011), Behiery (2012), Celik (2012), Elver (2012), Stehle
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wear,” writes Pamela Taylor (2008, 123), cofounder of Muslims for Progres-
sive Values in the United States. “Mostly, I don’t think about hijab,” she says,
“I worry about war, about women living in the shadow of oppressive regimes,
about poverty and hunger, about unfair laws and wasted lives. . . .The hijab is,
after all, just a scrap of cloth—a politically and emotionally charged scrap of
cloth, but an article of clothing nonetheless. My energies are better spent
making this world a kinder, safer, and more just place for all people” (128).2
Taylor’s message conveys more than she realizes, as a matter of fact, for
indeed there are Muslim women in the world for whom the veil is literally
“a scrap of cloth.” Many Muslim women living in parts of rural northwest
China, for instance, have to consider carefully the frequency with which they
wash their head covers. Grueling agricultural labor not only exhausts their ill-
nourished bodies, but sweat and the ﬁne yellowish gray dirt from the Loess
Plateau (Huangtu Gaoyuan) also soil their headscarves and hats in a matter
of minutes. The little water their families are able to save is carefully guarded
for Islamic ritual ablution, often prioritized above daily drinking needs.
Showers are rare, and laundry, when it is done at all, seldom uses clean water.
For these Muslim women, the material character of the veil—that it is “a
scrap of cloth” susceptible to easy pollution and in need of constant care—is
so signiﬁcant that they cannot afford to ignore it. When Taylor is throwing
her hịjāb into a washing machine while doing her weekly laundry, a young
Muslim woman in northwest China may be scratching her head trying to ﬁg-
ure out where she can get the water to wash her soiled veil or how she can pre-
vent it from getting dirty again during the next day’s labor.
This is certainly not to belittle Taylor’s ambition to ﬁght for social justice.
The particularity of her predicament invites not so much a criticism of the
parochialism of ﬁrst-world Muslim feminists as it does an ethnographically
grounded examination of how transnational political economy organizes
the terms and discourses through which issues of Muslim women’s head
coverings are spoken of. Signiﬁers, either such apparently trivial daily expres-
sions as “scrap of cloth” or grander claims about women’s agency in the Is-
lamic revival (Mahmood 2001, 2005), do not simply point to their signiﬁeds2 To be sure, the predicament that Taylor faces goes far beyond this weariness. She also
worries that wearing a hịjāb will put her in line with male Islamists whose political position
she does not concur with (2008, 125). She is equally uncomfortable with the possibility that
this choice may unwittingly buttress the view that non-hịjāb-wearing Muslim women are nec-
essarily lacking in piety and should not be allowed to speak for Islam (Bucar 2012, 126).
(2012), Özcan (2013), Gökarıksel and Secor (2014), and Selby (2014). The list of works dis-
cussed in this article is certainly not exhaustive.
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All uswhen they travel transnationally. In the case of the contrast between Taylor
and some of my women interlocutors in northwest China, the pragmatics of
such signiﬁers as “scrap of cloth”—what they do or what is done to them
rather than what they mean—is deeply embedded in the structural organi-
zation and distribution of materialities on a global scale.
During the two periods of my ﬁeldwork in Ningxia and Gansu Provinces
in northwest China (September 2011 to August 2012 and late 2014 to the
summer of 2015), my questions as to why one veils were almost invariably
met by a discomﬁting (to me) silence or brief responses such as “because
I am married.” On the other hand, I was often led into an unexpected
and surprisingly rich account of the stylistic shifts of the head cover that
scarcely addressed my concerns regarding notions of Islamic piety. While I
anticipated that my interlocutors would speak to the headscarf debate, what
actually happened in the ﬁeld was that I was increasingly drawn away from
the terms of that debate. As my work gradually deepened, the commonplace
treatment of Muslim women’s head wear as a sign also acquired a new di-
mension: that it could become a sign (certainly a heavily disputed and polit-
ically loaded one) for some is predicated on the fact that it cannot remain
merely a sign for others, and this contrast, as I shall argue in this article, is
articulated on a global scale.
By making this argument, I do not mean to simplify the historical com-
plexities that characterize the headscarf debate in a variety of distinct Euro-
American,Middle Eastern, North African, South Asian, and Southeast Asian
contexts. The history of colonialism, racism, and gendered orientalism that
continues to structure the perception and regulation of the hịjāb in France
gives the French headscarf controversy a different face than that given to
the debate in contemporary Algeria.3 Similarly, if wearing the hịjāb on the
campus of an American university can signal solidarity with the Palestinians
and a struggle for gender equity, in a different context it could also mean
support for gender hierarchy and segregation. It could function as a chal-
lenge to sexism and an assertion of gender equality in London, but these
“are not meanings that the hijab could possibly have in Cairo or Karachi
or Riyadh or Tehran” (Ahmed 2011, 213). Such differences are crucial
but not only because they urge us to distinguish between different political
conﬁgurations that entail distinct pragmatics of the same sign. Perhaps more
important, they also compel us to be particularly cautious when drawing
comparisons and making arguments that circulate transnationally. In order
to situate the intervention of this article more squarely within the current3 See Killian (2003), Scott (2007), and Bowen (2008, 2010); cf. Korteweg and Yurdakul
(2014, 44).
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critical issue of difference, let me begin by demonstrating howmy argument
builds on and differs from that proposed by Saba Mahmood.
For those of us who grew up or have conducted long-term ﬁeldwork in a
Muslim environment where contemporary forms of Islamism coexist with
other devotional practices such as Suﬁ collective or dream interpretation,
Mahmood’s widely acclaimed book Politics of Piety (2005) presents a di-
lemma perhaps not felt—at least not as intensely—by other feminist aca-
demics. On the one hand, it was published at a time when the social and
political ravage of Islamophobia was severely aggravated by the global “war
on terror.” The book emerges as a powerful voice that reorients the under-
standing of feminist agency and reveals the insidious harm wrought by the
hegemony of its liberal conception. It provides a reading of Islamic ethical
practice that is equally appealing to the sensibilities of certain strains of
Western anthropological and philosophical thought. For some of us, it made
a forceful argument at a particularly apt time.
On the other hand, however, it also provokes a sense of unease that grad-
uallymaterializes into various arguments and struggles intended to articulate
what some of us ﬁnd potentially troubling inMahmood’s book and its enor-
mous impact on later studies of Muslim women. Amina Jamal, for instance,
argues that the heavy focus on textual interpretive strategies and the treat-
ment of Islam as a discursive tradition might run the risk of neglecting other
forms of ecstatic and mystical practices of Islam that are historically more in-
ﬂuential in Pakistan, where she conducted her ﬁeldwork on the women’s
wing of Jamaat-e-Islami (2013, 6, 35–36). While studying Al-Huda, aMus-
limwomen’s social movement in Pakistan that shares much in commonwith
women’s mosque groups in Cairo, Sadaf Ahmed grew increasingly uncom-
fortable with the movement’s often exclusivist and puritanical pronounce-
ments and expresses her concern in the form of a series of questions: “Is
Pakistani culture . . . an exclusive articulation of predeﬁned and preconceived
‘Islamic’ values, or is it an amalgam of ancient pre-Islamic rites and non-
Islamic rituals, Islamic values, modern secular-colonial practices, and post-
modern globalizing tendencies? What is it that is keeping us from seeing
the advent of Islam on the Indian subcontinent as a foreign import, an act
of imperialism, merely our own position of being inside the hegemonic
religio-nationalist discourse?” (2009, 186).
Perhaps it is precisely because of such questions, the entanglement of
contradictory commitments they entail, and the profoundly affective power
they command, that Mahmood had to move her ﬁeld site from Pakistan—
where she had been deeply involved in feminist struggles—to Egypt, where
she could presumably keep a distance from similar questions raised amongThis content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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All usEgyptian feminists and academics (Mahmood 2005, xii).4 This detached
stance enables her to reﬂect more critically on her previous political position:
“The reason progressive leftists like myself have such difﬁculty recognizing
these aspects of Islamic revival movements, I think, owes in part to our pro-
found dis-ease with the appearance of religion outside of the private space of
individualized belief” (2005, xi; cf. 189). This much might have been true
for Mahmood, but for those of us who study Suﬁ collectives and dream in-
terpretations, what is alarming in some strains of contemporary Islamism is
not so much their “emergence” into the public sphere as the historically spe-
ciﬁc form of this publicness and its at times aggressive assertion against other
Islamic devotional practices. The privatization of Islam is merely one of
many contradictory political initiatives of the modern colonial and postcolo-
nial state, and it is very often preceded, crisscrossed, or supplanted by ofﬁcial
state support of Islam, a fact well registered by Mahmood. Moreover, for
those of us who work on Suﬁsm, the public engagement of Suﬁ orders is a
salient historical fact, and saint veneration and dream interpretation have
long been political. What contemporary Islamism changes, in other words,
is how Islam ﬁgures publicly and politically rather than whether Islam should
enter the public sphere (see Jamal 2013, 42–43). By setting a contrast be-
tween Cairene pietist women and (Western) secular liberals, Mahmood may
be leaving out a great portion of Muslim feminist intellectuals for whom
the question is framed in different terms and the politics of public religiosity
matters in a different way.
Many of the rural Hui Muslim women discussed in this article were born
into Suﬁ families in Ningxia and Gansu, two provinces in northwest China
with a large Muslim population. Their ancestors—both male and female—
had fought courageously either to protect their orders against suspicious
emperors or merely to survive in an inhospitable natural environment where
prolonged drought was normal. They often participate in collective rituals
alongside men, and the preparation of communal dining and distribution
of blessed consumables, both crucial for the consummation of the rite, rely
heavily upon women’s labor contribution. For them, Islam has never been
“private,” thoughmany still feel uncomfortable with the public assertiveness
of some younger urbanMuslimwomen, not the least because they are some-
times criticized by the latter.4 See Selim (2010) for a critique of Mahmood that reveals similar structural dilemmas in
Egypt, hence demonstrating that it is not so much a question of whether a certain place is con-
ducive to a detached and patient labor of thought as it is one of who can afford to occupy a
position where the urgency others are forced to feel may not be perceived as so powerful as
to constantly prevent the successful enactment of a particular kind of intellectual labor.
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China do not cherish and cultivate Islamic piety in their daily lives and ritual
acts. The point that ethical self-cultivation can take different forms, and that
the same norm can be inhabited in contradictory ways, has already been el-
oquently made by Mahmood, who also shows that even the piety movement
itself is marked by internal dissent. The argument I want tomake in this article
is not merely that such differences exist in the world or that differential
positionalities coexist as parallels but rather that these differences are trans-
nationally articulated and distributed on a global scale. This transnational ar-
ticulation and distribution—the historically speciﬁc structural organization
of heterogeneities—needs to be seen in tandem with transnational political
economy. Between Pamela Taylor and my interlocutors in northwest China
is not merely a chasm that separates different, even contrasting, modes of eth-
ical self-cultivation but also an organized international political economy that
distributes both religious and politico-economic values around the globe. The
difference is not between two or more worlds but within the same world. Fo-
cusing on particularistic ontologies and revealing the speciﬁcmanifestations of
concealment in a local context, as is masterfully accomplished by Anjum Alvi
(2013), can undoubtedly enrich our knowledge of Muslim women and pro-
vide timely caution for our politics, but it also runs the risk of a certain relativ-
ism that prevents us from seeing how the world is differentially assembled as
much as it is partitioned at the level of ontology. As we have produced an
enormous amount of work exploring the latter, perhaps it is time that we be-
gin to think more carefully and critically about the former. It is in this direc-
tion that this article hopes to make its intervention.
In the next section, I situate the particular kind of head cover worn by the
rural Hui women in northwest China, namely maozi (the “hat” that can be
seen in ﬁg. 2), in relation to other Islamic sartorial items donned by younger
and often (sub)urban Muslim women. This contrast unfolds not only at the
level of clothing styles but also at the level of their discursive representation.
While the (sub)urban women who don the more religiously marked gaitou
(“head cover,” here a conventional designation reserved largely for hịjāb)
are equipped with a large vocabulary and an abundance of discourse on pi-
ety, few of the rural Hui women I interviewed could offer a religious expla-
nation of the maozi that made their narrative assimilable into the headscarf
debate as we know it. They fell silent when I probed them on issues that I
was interested in and spoke on topics that I initially could hardly make con-
ceptual sense of, such as the many shifts ofmaozi in its color and fabric over
the years. This article results from my ongoing struggle to come to terms
with the tension between what I expected to hear and what I was compelled
to listen to.This content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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All usThis discussion is followed by a more detailed ethnographic study of
maozi. Through examining its multiple stylistic changes, I will substantiate
my argument proposed above by showing that, ﬁrst, rather than discourses
on Islamic piety, narratives ofmaozi lead us to focus on the issue of women’s
labor and the vicissitudes of its historical form both in the socialist and in the
neoliberal periods. Tracing changes ofmaozi forces us to follow the politico-
economic transformations that encompass the world where ruralHui women
live rather than how norms of piety are inhabited through the practice of
veiling. Second, this tracing also offers us a glimpse of the middle link that
makes visible the transnational politico-economic chain that binds my inter-
locutors in rural Ningxia and Gansu to ﬁrst-world Muslim feminists such as
Pamela Taylor in the United States. The link between rural Muslim women
and their urban sisters (particularly women workers), forged by the socialist
articulation of female labor power, was severed in the neoliberal period, and
this separation, while instituting a sharp urban-rural division, also relegated
rural Hui women to an abject position, their maozi ridiculed as a sign of
backwardness, lack of aesthetic taste, and more frequently than before, of un-
Islamic and “customary” practices. FromTaylor in theUnited States to young
Muslim women in urban China, on to the rural Hui women in Ningxia and
Gansu, the transnational articulation of religious difference needs to be seen
as linked to the transnational distribution of values and materialities. If the
sign, in this case the heavily disputed Muslim women’s veil, cannot be de-
tached from its material quality (Keane 2007, 2013), then this semiotic inter-
est in materiality ought to be inﬂected by a Marxian analysis of the global
political economy that organizes the production and distribution of material-
ities. As I said above and shall try to show in the following, that the veil could
become a sign for some is predicated on the fact that it could not remainmerely
a sign for others. It is this heterogeneous chain that I hope to ﬂesh out and
render visible in this article.Situating maozi
The maozi worn by rural Hui women in northwest China could hardly be
confused with any conventional headscarf or the “new veil” adopted by Is-
lamist women in the mid-1970s (Macleod 1991, 1992). Since the early
1990s, it has been increasingly marginalized by the “new veil,” as the youn-
ger generation of Hui women turn to the latest styles of gaitou that circulate
across national borders in conjunction with contemporary Islamist ideol-
ogies emanating both from the Gulf states and from Southeast Asia. While
aspiring Hui have long pursued Islamic studies at the Islamic University of
Madīna, Malaysia has emerged as another attractive location in the past de-This content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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tion of modernity and Islamic piety. Though many Hui students drop out
before graduation to seek a business career, there is nonetheless a steady in-
crease in the number of Islamic clerics and teachers who return to China af-
ter the conclusion of their studies.
To be sure, most of these returning students are middle-aged men, pas-
sionate about spreading their new message freshly adopted from the “cen-
ter” of Islam. Schools are founded mostly in suburban areas where land is
readily available for purchase and conversion into campuses. Some receive
regular donations from the Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait being
the two major sources of donors, while others tend to rely entirely on the
goodwill of local Muslim entrepreneurs. Many of these schools follow strict
rules of gender segregation, and some are established exclusively for girls.
That such schools can acquire the land they need is predicated on a general
transformation in China’s rural areas. In both Ningxia and Gansu, large
tracts of farmland have been expropriated by the local governments over
the past two decades and put on sale to ﬁnance their large-scale construction
of local infrastructure. The reapportioning of land for the sake of creating
industrial parks (gongye yuan) to invite both domestic and foreign invest-
ment has also considerably diminished the amount of land owned by indi-
vidual peasant families. As we shall see, it is precisely this land policy that
has tied some older Hui women—those who still wear the maozi—ﬁrmly
to agricultural labor in the neoliberal period. The global rise of neoliberalism
and its particular incarnation in China have thus both enabled more Hui
Muslim men to acquire the ﬁnancial resources needed to pursue Islamic
studies abroad and prepared the economic conditions that give them the so-
cial and material space where they can spread their message of piety upon
return. At the same time, however, these same conditions also push the rural
Hui women who wear the maozi further down the politico-economic and
symbolic hierarchy.
Although the “new veil” ﬁnds its most palpable presence in these girls’
schools, it also spreads rapidly among college students who are eager to re-
form the Islam in which they were brought up. Discourses about these new
gaitou are often built around a newly found religious piety and sense of self-
fulﬁllment. Younger Hui women are also more willing to speak about their
motivation in veiling. They have the requisite textual and dispositional rep-
ertoire to offer an eloquent response to a question such as “what is your view
about wearing the gaitou?” Compared to the volubility of these young
women, the wearers ofmaozi were considerably more reticent when I inter-
viewed them with the same question. While the religious connotation of
gaitou cuts across generation and marital status, it is only married womenThis content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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All uswho wear the maozi. They are often required by their families to put it on
upon marriage.
Many studies of Muslim women have relied heavily on interviews in their
investigations. Sherifa Zuhur, for instance, in her informative work on young
Egyptianmuhạjabāt (those who wear the hịjāb) in the late 1980s, conducted
extensive structured and semistructured interviews with ﬁfty Cairene women.
It is signiﬁcant that the “peasant woman (fallaha)” is not included in her sam-
ple. “Up to now, the Islamists have not visibly recruited many rural women,”
although “the situation may change as rural migrants continue to pour into
the cities of Egypt” (Zuhur 1992, 9). Nancy Smith-Hefner’s rich article on
Javanese Muslim women, for another example, also draws its data from
“150 in-depth interviews” with primarily middle-class men and women in
the central Javanese city of Yogyakarta (2007, 391 n. 3).5 The underlying pre-
sumption is often that women would naturally have something to tell the re-
searcher when questioned about their intention in adopting the veil. The per-
sistence of this presumption may have to do with the fact that most of these
studies are conducted in an urban context and focus mainly on university stu-
dents and middle-class Muslim women, for whom the terms of the headscarf
debate are often fairly well known. This choice of informants is not surprising,
as it is precisely these women who form the core of the female recruits of the
Islamic resurgence in many parts of the Muslim world. They are well situated
to offer what the anthropologist hopes to gather or expects to hear.
The reverse is true of the women who wear maozi. Though there is real
family and neighborhood pressure for women to keep their maozi on, few
women voice complaints. The maozi is so pervasive as not to deserve any
special attention—it appears unremarkable and is barely noticed. When
some younger women do complain, their grumble is less an indictment of
male oppression than a worry that the maozi could hardly go with their
new outﬁt. Apart from these, the maozi seldom receives any comment. If
the new hịjāb possesses the impressive power to circulate across national
borders and to elicit interest and discourses across a broad range of political
parties and academic interpreters, themaozi seems to be located at the other
end of the spectrum: it remains lodged in the rural and suburban areas,
drawing little attention from those concerned with more explicitly religious
sartorial changes. In contrast to the multifarious and subtle functions of the
veil in signaling social relations of intimacy and distance (Abu-Lughod
1986, 1993), the maozi comes across as bearing little ﬂexibility: apart from5 For other studies that also rely heavily upon interviews, see Ruby (2006), Droogsma
(2007), Afshar (2008), O’Neill et al. (2014), and Abbas (2015). For a more critical use of in-
terview as a method of research, see Macleod (1991).
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social distance in its inﬁnite degrees of differentiation.
However, ifmaozi scarcely constitutes a gravitational point around which
discourses of piety and practices of intimacy cohere, its stylistic shifts, as we
shall see in the next two sections, encode a complex history of women’s la-
bor. This very history locates rural Hui women in a position where pro-
longed discourses about the intimate link between veiling and piety might
not be capable of giving voice to their particular female subjectivity, which
may be one of the reasons whymyHui women interlocutors seldom resorted
to such discourses when they narrated to me the otherwise dense and rich
history ofmaozi. The different positions and the underlining power differen-
tials between them and the urban women pietists, embedded in the hetero-
geneous transnational political economy, have equally instituted a symbolic
economy that distributes words and discourses on a global scale. Both the
condition of labor and its representation inHui women’s imagination are re-
ﬂected in changes to the maozi ’s color and fabric: while the popularity of a
dark hue owes much to the intention to hide the sweat marks resulting from
backbreaking ﬁeld labor in the neoliberal period, for several decades in the
socialist period, the white maozi functioned as a hinge that connected rural
Hui women to their urbanworking sisters byway of imagination, thus in part
re-presenting their agricultural labor as similar to the politically more honor-
able industrial labor of the urban proletariat.Maozi might have been a sign
all along, but it has never beenmerely a sign. It covers Hui women’s hair and
functions to cultivate locally held feminine virtues. But it also absorbs sweat
and smell, and its cleaning requires the use of water, which for many rural
Hui women in Ningxia and Gansu must be reserved for irrigation and ritual
ablution. All this compels us to turn to the history of female labor in north-
west China.Labor’s color: The socialist articulation of female labor power
Mayi was a middle-aged Muslim woman when I met her during my ﬁeld-
work in Wuzhong, part of China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
Wrapped in thick layers to counter the severe cold of the freezing Ningxia
winter, she sold incense and Islamic accessories in front of a renowned
Jahriyya Suﬁ daotang (“hall of Dao”). Seeing me on a daily basis, she in-
sisted calling me ahong, the Persian word for religious scholar that is widely
used among the Hui. Known for her perseverance and extraordinary ﬁnan-
cial skills, she wielded much power in her family, to the point where her hus-
band was said to be “too weak” to assume the role of the household head.
Upon discovering that I was interested in learning about women’s maozi,This content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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changed over time!”What she gaveme the next day was captured in ﬁgure 4.
Sevenmaozi of different colors were neatly and carefully laid out, in chrono-
logical order from the bottomup.Mayi did not havemuch to say except that,
“I don’t have the maozi made of laobaibu (‘old white cloth’). That was the
earliest. So I only gave you a piece of laobaibu rather than themaozi itself. It
wasmianbu (‘cotton cloth’). Now women don’t wear it, because people useFigure 4 “Labor’s Colour.” Photo by the author. A color version of this ﬁgure is available
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is bu jili (‘not auspicious’). Besides, some think that it makes you look like
a nigu (‘Buddhist nun’).”
Few of these statements can stand a reality test, in fact: the use of white
cotton cloth for mourning clothes is a long-term customary practice that
did not prevent its being used for sewingmaozi in the past, and many—even
most—Buddhist nuns in China wear head covers whose color and style make
them easily distinguishable from maozi of laobaibu. However, it is also true
that the piece of “old white cloth” says much more than Mayi realized at the
time. It is not coincidental that she did not have amaozi ready-made from it.
We need to go back to the history of rural women’s labor and its twists and
turns since the early twentieth century to come to grips with this apparently
trivial detail.
Writing in 1939, the distinguished Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong
observed that the economic depression of China’s rural peasantry was the re-
sult of a combination of several factors, themost important being the decline
of domestic industry. Through meticulous calculation based on data col-
lected from a rural village in the Yangtze Valley, he suggested that the house-
hold production of silk, rather than the plowing of land, contributed the
necessary supplement without which the life of the peasant family would be
practically unsustainable. However, the forced integration of China into
the world capitalist market and the subsequent drop in silk prices sent the
rural economy into a deep plunge. This, according to Fei, was the core of
the hunger problem facing China’s peasantry (1939). What he does not
emphasize but what is apparent throughout his detailed ethnography is the
fact that it was mainly the rural women who were most heavily hit by a dis-
tant world market beyond their reach, since it was they who were the major
workforce in household spinning and weaving. The role of women is made
clearer in a later essay, though the issue of gender is again overshadowed by
the general concern with rural industry: “in my youth I helped my grand-
mother spin cloth, and among my mother’s marriage gifts there was a spin-
ning wheel” (Fei 1953, 114). Although the domestic production of silk was
speciﬁc to coastal provinces, household spinning and weaving was a com-
mon component of rural industry across China. It would not be surprising,
therefore, if the earlier maozi were made from homespun cotton cloth,
which was often white.
The continual progression of economic collectivization, initiated by the
socialist revolution in the late 1940s, culminated in the nationwide estab-
lishment of communes by the end of the 1950s. Rural industry was reorga-
nized, and women’s position both within the family and in the local commu-
nity shifted largely as a result of changes to their labor status. Particularly inThis content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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long predated the collective period. From the 1920s to the late 1940s, men
working in the ﬁeld were under constant threat of forced abduction and con-
scription as a result of the ceaseless wars among local warlords and between
the Nationalist Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Many men were al-
ways on the run and seldom sent remittances back home, if they survived and
managed to ﬁnd some kind of job. Women, left behind and without much
means to get by, were compelled to assume the role of themain breadwinner
for the patrilineal stem family. They were not offered the “luxury” of seclu-
sion, although some may have held female domestic conﬁnement as a norm
to aspire to. The attraction of the cultural norm is here augmented by its
more explicit association with class status. As Elizabeth Croll points out,
“if ideally women did one [household affairs] and abstain from the other
[public spheres], it was the prerogative of the richer classes to live up to these
norms. Among the poor, economic factors interceded to a greater or lesser
degree to modify these standards in practice” (Croll 1978, 15; see also Her-
shatter 2011).
Rather than a complete break from the past, what collectivization brought
about was a reorganization of women’s labor both in and outside the do-
mestic sphere. A similar structural division of labor was preserved, however.
Many men were sent out by their collectives for nonagricultural sideline
jobs or other paid employment to earn cash for the commune, and women
continued to be responsible for the bulk of agricultural work (Hershatter
2011, 130). The decline of women’s domestic handicrafts—the spinning
and weaving that used to occur primarily within the household—was only
the predictable consequence of the nationalization of the economy and the
strict restrictions imposed on market exchange. At this point, Hui Muslim
women not only did not purchase ready-mademaozi from the market, they
could not even make the cloth in their private chambers. As a result of col-
lectivization, they relied exclusively on state distribution for the acquisition
of basic industrial products. Even if they continued to spin and weave, they
spun and wove not for their own consumption. They worked for the state
and received their share from the state; both production and consumption
were mediated by the public organization of labor power. Again, maozi
was not a commodity to be purchased ready-made from the market, but
now even the cloth itself was subject to uniform state distribution. So it is
completely understandable that Mayi did not have a maozi made from
laobaibu: the “old white cloth” came in only as raw material and never in
the completed shape ofmaozi. The last step only occurred in the household,
and by means of women’s manual labor under the dim light of a kerosene
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differential institution of distinct labor regimes in the rural and urban areas
also created a new scheme of representation in which Hui Muslim women’s
maozi began to acquire a new value. Even more signiﬁcant, this new scheme
was also modeled on the grammar of female labor. The fact that rural Hui
women could only rely on the state for the redistribution of industrially pro-
duced cloth for theirmaozi points us to the highly gendered textile factories
where such cloth was mass-produced by their urban sisters. Hailing both
from urban residential quarters and from suburban and rural areas through
strictly regulated labor migration regimes, these women workers also wore
maozi—of almost the same style as that worn by the Hui women but as part
of their uniform—that were made from the same type of cloth they them-
selves produced on the machinery.
To be sure, this did not mean that a more immediate relationship existed
between the labor power of urban women textile workers and the products
of their labor. Both this relationship and that between rural Hui women and
their maozi were mediated by the socialist collective organization of labor
power. There was in fact a higher-order relationship ofmutual mediation be-
tween these two relationships: on the one hand, rural Hui Muslim women,
by engaging in heavy agricultural labor, produced the necessary staple crops
that were vital to the ration system that sustained the reproduction of fe-
male labor power in the urban textile factory. The labor of rural Muslim
women, in other words, functioned to mediate the seemingly immediate re-
lationship between the spindle and the hands of urban women workers. On
the other hand, as we have already seen, while they contributed to the repro-
duction of urban labor power, rural Hui women also relied exclusively on
their sister textile workers in state factories for the production of the cloth
that made their maozi. If it was labor power that was reproduced in the city,
it was largely a patriarchal symbolic order that was reproduced in the country-
side, and this dual reproduction across great distances hinged upon the dif-
ferential articulation of two distinct forms of female labor: that of the rural
women peasants and that of the urban women textile workers.
It is in relation to this complex labor regime that we need to situate the rep-
resentational value of Hui Muslim women’s maozi during this period. As in-
dustrialization gradually spread, particularly until the end of the 1970s, when
neoliberal reform was at the doorstep, rural Hui women’s maozi began to
share the same material and color as that worn by urban textile workers.
The more or less natural yellowish white gave way to a bleached snow-white.
The industrial touch was brought about by a change in fabric as well—rather
than pure cotton,maoziwas nowmanufacturedwith polyester, known inChi-
nese as diqueliang, or “truly cool.” This by-no-means coincidental conver-This content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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All usgence endowed the maozi with a new meaning. Rural Hui Muslim women
were now able to align their own labor with that of their urban sister workers
whose form of labor straddled two models, both propagated by the state:
they were members of the urban proletariat, and they were engaged in a
quintessentially feminine form of labor.6 The shifting of the labor context
from the rural to the urban, as a result of the socialist collectivization of in-
dustrial production, did not change the gendered meaning of spinning and
weaving, either by hand or by modern machinery. While rural Hui women
were separated from their urban sister workers at the level of relations of
production, they were joined at the level of consumption by the tenuous
yet signiﬁcant imaginary rendered possible by the sharing of the same kind
of maozi. During the socialist period, the wide circulation of images of the
urban woman textile worker, wearing the white maozi and busying herself
with the mechanical loom, reinforced this imaginary link and made it all
the more alluring for rural Muslim women. With the onset of the 1980s,
the new maozi circulated in the market, this time ready-made perhaps for the
ﬁrst time in history, with other fashionable clothing and accessories that
were also fabricated with “truly cool.”Specters of neoliberalism
As the economic reform continued in the 1990s, perhaps not surprisingly
the structural articulation between urban and rural women laborers seen in
the socialist period began to unravel as well. Maozi began to have its own
fashion, too.7 A touch of light lavender blue was added to the dye, and no
one seemed to knowwhy or how this happened initially. SomeHui women
simply said this “looks nicer” without being able to explain why it was blue
rather than another color that made the maozi nicer. Others thought this6 For the history of female textile workers and the gendered meanings of the industry, see
Honig (1986) and Rofel (1999).
7 Scholars have long noted the salience of transnationally circulated fashion in Muslim
women’s choice to veil. For instance, ﬁnding an intriguing connection between religion and
capitalism through the Marxian term “commodity fetishism,” Carla Jones (2007, 2010) has
explored how the fetish built into the commodity might both buttress and interfere with
the attraction of fashionable veils in facilitating Islamic piety in Indonesia. The ideology of re-
ligious devoutness, indicated by the donning of fashionable veils, reinforces through the notion
of individual piety the structural concealment of the relations of production that underpin the
manufacture of these sartorial items. Commodity fetishism here taps into explicitly religious
values. For the articulation of fashion and piety, see also Macleod (1991, 106), Zuhur (1992,
59), Smith-Hefner (2007, 413–14), Ahmed (2011, 101, 133), Korteweg and Yurdakul (2014,
9), and Abbas (2015).
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color they like.”Of all these explanations, one stands out as particularly in-
triguing, not because it offers the deﬁnitive answer but because it bears a
distinct mark of the new era of market economy: some women suggested
that the maozi were dyed a light blue because some manufacturers had to
ﬁnd a way to dispose of excess blue pigment that could not be consumed
in the production process. “They needed to use it up, so they dipped the
maozi in it. They did not think much. But when the maozi came out,
everyone liked them. They were sold out immediately. So now everyone
wears a blue maozi rather than a white one,” a Hui woman in her mid-
thirties told me. The waste is recycled, and the result, miraculously, is even
more proﬁtable than the original. One could hardly think of a better note
on the unpredictability and uncertainty—hence risk, adventure, and quick
money—presented by an emerging and amorphous market.
However, this fabulous story still cannot explain why the blue went through
different shades, particularly why lavender blue was suddenly replaced by a
much darker Egyptian blue, which was only gradually lightened for later
maozi. “White maozi makes your face look darker, while dark blue makes
your face look whiter,” a middle-aged Hui woman answered my question
succinctly. But the issue of complexion reaches far deeper than a fashion
preference. The neoliberal reform did not produce a complete reconﬁgura-
tion of the gendered division of labor in rural northwest China. If anything,
it largely perpetuated the old structure: rather than being sent off by their
collectives, men nowmove voluntarily as migrant workers into the city, leav-
ing their aged parents and young children behind.8 Women again become
the major (sometimes only) workforce in rural agriculture—men come
and go, but women appear to be literally “earthbound” (Fei and Zhang
1948).
In theWuzhong countrysidewhereMayi lives, andmore generally in north-
west China, the reallocation of farmland for industrial development and the
aggressive New Rural Construction (xinnongcun jianshe) project since the
early 2000s, both vital for the local government in its attempts to generate
revenue, entail a speciﬁc consequence for women. Since the amount of land
left for each individual household decreased considerably, the income—if
any—from agriculture hardly ﬁgures prominently in the family budget. Men
(except those in their sixties and seventies) rarely waste their energy on the
family land, and plowing and harvesting are left largely to women. This gen-
eral economic shift has produced a further division among the rural women8 This is not to deny that in certain regions of China, it was women rather than men who
initiated labor migration both in the socialist and in the reform periods. See Yan (2003, 2008).
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All usas well: some families with adjoining plots would rent their land to a single
family to be cultivated by the women of that household, occasionally with-
out asking for any payment. Those “liberated” from agricultural labor nor-
mally work odds-and-ends jobs in the nearby town or the nearest city. Many
of them rarely leave their own province, and even if they work alongside their
husbands on construction sites (a common temporary occupation among
migrant workers), they tend to be treated as xiaogong (“minor workers”),
paid much less and assigned jobs considered unskilled, though not necessar-
ily physically less demanding.9 To look whiter in this context is to convey the
idealistic message that one has been removed from backbreaking manual la-
bor under the scorching sun. A dark blue maozi could help to deny at the
level of representation what continues to remain undeniable at the level of
daily production.
For those Hui women who are indeed left behind to shoulder the burden
of agricultural labor, another factor speciﬁc to northwest China aggravates
their situation. Draught is the climatic norm for a large part of this vast area.
In southern Ningxia, which is ﬁve hours’ drive from where Mayi lives, low
precipitation rates and rapid vaporization force the local Hui peasants to
come up with innovative ways to save water. In addition to drilling deep
wells, many families dig underground vaults (shuijiao) to store snow and
rainwater. The walls of the chamber are often covered by local waterproof
clay. “We leave the water set so the manures and grass will slowly sediment.
Then we drink from the top,” a Hui woman told me. A family can hardly
get by with this water. The performance of the ﬁve daily prayers and other
Islamic rituals require a steady supply of fresh water, while drinking and irri-
gation are necessary for mere survival. In this daily struggle to save and use
water most efﬁciently, a mother-in-law would not enjoy seeing her young
daughter-in-law wash her maozi on a daily basis. “A white maozi gets dirty
easily, while dark blue can conceal the sweat marks and you don’t need to
wash it every day,”was a common reply I received frommarried Hui women
during my ﬁeldwork (ﬁg. 5).
Over the years the color of themaozi has continued to change, taking un-
expected turns that can nonetheless be linked to labor. Women’s admiration
for nurses (who in China wear pink hats with their uniforms)—their profes-
sionalism, cleanliness, their supposedly quintessentially feminine job in an
environment far removed from agricultural labor—led them in the 2000s
to prefer maozi with a light pinkish color. This trend was reinforced after a
ﬂurry of state media coverage that portrayed the altruism of nurses in the af-
termath of the severe Sichuan earthquake in 2008. The pink maozi became9 I thank Will Thomson for bringing this to my attention.
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could be represented and reimagined as similar to that performed by the
nurses, considered now to be feminine prototypes. Although contemporary
maozi continue to be made from polyester, the fabric has become much
more durable, and in contrast to earlier versions,maozi worn by current Hui
women retain their cylindrical shape even after numerous machine washes,
as the washing machine gradually ﬁnds its way into some rural Hui homes
(see ﬁg. 6).
Meanwhile, rapid urbanization and the loosening of control over labor
migration since the 1990s have also brought many rural Hui women into
the city. Their blue and pink maozi have become a distinct mark of rurality,
“backwardness,” and “lack of taste,” not just in the eyes of non-Muslim
women. When Maris Gillette wrote in 2000 about the contested adoption
of skirts among Hui Muslim women in China’s northwestern city of Xi’an,
urban Hui women were also subject to the increasing inﬂuence of transna-
tional Islamic fashion radiating from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, theUnited Emir-
ates, and—closer to home—Malaysia (209–10). Gaitou, rather than merely
an indication of piety or modesty, becomes a fashion statement and a ﬁgure
of one’s class status, while maozi, despite its changes throughout the years,
appears too familiar, too predictable—even a little hideous for some urban
Hui Muslim women. “You see, these young Hui women. They look quite
fashionable, but the maozi is a giveaway,” a middle-class Hui woman onceFigure 5 A Hui Muslim woman lifting water from shuijiao in Tongxin, Ningxia, 2015. Cour-
tesy of Ma Xiaofeng. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.This content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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All usremarked to me, while pointing at amaozi-wearing woman dressed in a pair
of UGG boots. Perhaps not surprising, the structural link between urban
women textile workers and rural Hui women has been severed and super-
seded by a transnational network of consumption that aggravates the grow-
ing schism separating urban women from their rural sisters.Conclusion
In this article, rather than taking maozi as a point of departure for posing
questions about piety and ethical self-cultivation, I have used it as a diagnos-
tic of the impact of transnational political economy on rural Hui Muslim
women in northwest China. In making this shift, I have followed the analyt-
ical approach proposed by Lila Abu-Lughod in 1990. While she took the
speciﬁc form and location of resistance as a diagnostic of complex workings
of power, thus criticizing what she dubbed the “romance of resistance”
(Abu-Lughod 1990; see also 2013), in this article I have tried to use the
shifting materialities of the maozi and their articulation in transnational po-
litical economy to question what might be called the romance of ethical self-
cultivation that results from the broad application of Saba Mahmood’s ar-
gument in contemporary studies of Muslim women around the world.
The ethnography ofmaozi shows that either in the socialist or the neolib-
eral period, this particular item of women’s clothing always invokes the spe-Figure 6 The pink maozi, in Zhangjiachuan, Gansu Province, northwest China. Photo by the
author. July 12, 2015. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.This content downloaded from 195.195.176.005 on June 07, 2019 01:38:27 AM
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women’s domestic labor of weaving and spinning; the bleached white
diqueliang (“truly cool”) is a product of the socialist articulation of female
labor power across the rural-urban divide and provides the conditions for ru-
ral Hui women to reimagine their agricultural labor in line with that of the
urban proletarian; the different shades of blue given to themaozi in the neo-
liberal period bespeak the new conﬁguration of labor relations (reapportion-
ing and fragmentation of land, women as the major agricultural workforce,
and their marginal position in construction work, to name just a few) that
offers few possibilities of politico-economic well-being; and the more recent
pinkmaozi, in its invocation of the nonagricultural and professional occupa-
tion of the female nurse, expresses many rural Hui women’s desire to break
free from onerous ﬁeld labor and achieve upward social mobility. At a time
when many rural Muslim women are forced by circumstances to remain
bound to agriculture, the maozi has perhaps become a particularly signiﬁ-
cant site for condensing and expressing their desire for a different life.
We also need to pay attention to how these Hui women narrate their own
stories. As I have mentioned,maozi seldom elicits a conversation on piety or
self-cultivation: my interlocutors are much less interested in telling me why
they wear themaozi than they are in recounting to me what speciﬁc changes
the maozi has undergone in recent history. They rarely dwell on their atti-
tude toward veiling or offer me their opinion on piety and feminine virtue.
My initial attempt at using maozi to broach interviews on the ethical prac-
tice of piety could hardly get through, while inquiries on maozi ’s color and
fabric often led to a lively discussion. Discourses on ethical self-cultivation
sometimes run the risk of being appropriated by male Islamists.10 But maozi
seems to be stuck in a silent corner, outside the bustle of feminist discourses
and Islamist propaganda, unable to speak up or to elicit attention. Turning
to labor has enabled me to listen to its silence, to explore the relevance of
this silence to the headscarf controversy, and to ground the transnational
feminist concern within translational political economy.11
When the androcentric Islamist discourse shows no interest in the maozi,
when urban hịjāb-wearing and fashion-loving women accuse the maozi of
being a sign of rural backwardness and customary practice irrelevant—even
antithetical—to Islam, when we struggle to dispute Islamophobia by arguing
that women can indeed acquire agency by inhabiting rather than resisting the10 For male Islamist appropriation of the veil and its interpretations, see Smith-Hefner
(2007, 413–14), Weber (2012), and Ibrahimhakkioglu (2013).
11 I am deeply indebted to Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988, 1989) for this shift of per-
spective.
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women in rural northwest China. Or perhaps it has never been silent. In order
to render its voice audible and its story comprehensible, we need to link the
transnational articulation of difference and the transnational organization of
ethical practice to the transnational distribution of values and materialities,
as I have tried to achieve in this article. The notion of ethical self-cultivation
is an invitation to rethink the intrinsic link between global Islamism and global
political economy. This may be the most profound theoretical challenge that
maozi sets before us.
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